BATISTA OUTLAWS THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN COLD WAR CUBA

by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe on May 21, 2013

Havana: Batista Solidifies His Coup

Despite the domestic origins of the coup, the US embraced the new regime within the framework of the escalating Cold War conflict since Batista quickly ended relations with the Soviet Union — which he himself had established in 1942 — and then outlawed the Cuban Communist Party.

The Cold War association with the US was soon overshadowed, however, by the creation of more favorable conditions for foreign capital which led to a significant increase in US investments and tourism.

Subsequently, US executive branch policy toward the military regime became located primarily in the relationship between the two socio-economic systems, concentrating on the specific role allocated to private capital, especially American capital. Even so, Cold War exigencies continued to be important. Jules R. Benjamin notes:

Ties between the United States and Cuban militaries were also strengthened in this period as the Pentagon began to concern itself with the question of ‘hemisphere defense’ and returned to the generosity in supplying arms that had characterized the World War II period.  Batista wholly adopted this perspective and attempted to draw from the Pentagon not only military hardware but a close relationship with the group of U.S. military advisers whose job it was to help train Cubans in the use of the weapons with which they would take up their share of the Cold War burden. As time went on, it also helped to convince some of Batista’s enemies that the United States was a principal prop of his regime.

Ultimately, however, despite the militaristic aspects of Washington’s relationship with Batista, the eventual excesses of the dictatorship were viewed by American officials largely in terms of their impact on existing and long-term capital operations on the island.

Domestic opposition was also muted.  Surprisingly, neither of the two principal political parties–the Autentico or the Ortodoxo–responded to the military coup with either a comprehensive program or a compelling plan of action. Since Batista promised new elections in 1954, the parties were not necessarily alarmed. On the contrary, they were thrown into disarray and confusion.

The little opposition that did arise originated largely from outside the organized political parties, principally from ousted military officers, splinter political groups, and personalistic factions of the major parties.

Most early opposition took place well outside of the capital, although Fidel Castro, a young Ortodoxo, did present a legal brief in the Court of Appeals in Havana demanding imprisonment for Batista and his collaborators for violating the constitution.  Not unexpectedly, the court disavowed the request. Shortly thereafter, Castro rejected negotiations with Batista as a means to bring an end to the dictatorship and became a leading proponent of armed insurrection.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe.

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COLD WAR IRAN: OIL AND WEAPONS (PART 2)

by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe on May 20, 2013

Nixon and the Shah of Iran

By the 1970s Iran’s rentier state had broad influence — politically, socially, and economically.

The shah had adopted a capitalistic program of industrial and economic expansion to be fueled by the regime’s expenditures on industry, construction and services. The program relied on the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Development Plans (1962-1977) for implementation and planning. The expenditures delineated in these plans were closely linked to shifts in the price of oil and, thus, to the world capitalist economy.

When the OPEC oil cartel raised prices in the early 1970s, the shah had a large influx of revenue that could be used for industrial and military modernization. When world demand for oil contracted from 1975-1977, projects had to be cut and many workers lost their jobs. Since the shah personally made all major decisions, resentment with such happenings was focused on his person. Moreover, the reliance on oil was closely intertwined with the activities of foreign transnational corporations and issues of national security.

To compare, the arrival of the American multinational in Taipei in the early 1960s had the effect of fueling extraordinary economic growth. Not only did MNCs provide labor intensive employment for thousands of Taiwanese (especially for young women), they inaugurated a proliferation of SMEs since the state required the use of local inputs wherever possible.

The role of the transnational corporation in Iran, on the other hand, was quite different. Two major sectors — oil and defense — had the most substantial impact over time.

Although oil had been Iran’s link to the global economic system since its discovery in 1908, in the context of the Cold War conflict it became a strategic commodity.

American administrations were forced to come to grips with the strategic nature of oil because, as Simon Bromley notes:

. . . oil alone, at least in the postwar period, played such a large and central role in military mobility . . . . Because of this strategic quality, US control over the international oil order played a vital role in the constitution and maintenance of its postwar hegemony.

Oil represented both the military and the economic aspects of American grand strategy.

In Taipei, the penetration of the multinational corporation, while facilitated by cooperation between the US military and the KMT government, had been dictated by the economic needs of the capitalist enterprise — a search for cheap labor and high profits.

In Iran, the penetration of the multinational oil corporation was determined by both the strategic necessity of ensuring access to oil for military purposes and by the competitive nature of the capitalist system. Consequently, the pressures on American oil companies from the US government were at least equal to those emanating from the Iranian state.

In the case of oil . . . US policy in the Middle East — specifically, in Saudi Arabia during the 1940s, in Iran in 1953-1954, and with respect to OPEC until the winter of 1973-1974 — was primarily concerned with the stability and general pro-Western orientation of the conservative oil-producing regimes, a task rendered problematic by the United States’ simultaneous support for Israel. US policy in the period leading up to the events of 1973-4 maintained this stance despite the objections of the major oil companies to price increases and nationalizations.

Still, while American oil companies were sometimes pressured by the US government to make concessions to Iran, acting in the interest of US national security rather than according to their preferred corporate strategy, unlike the case of Taiwan, the Iranian state had not been able to dictate MNC entry on its own terms.

In order to successfully resolve the Mossadegh crisis of the early 1950s, Iran had opened its doors to American oil companies under less than optimal conditions.

Regardless, by the mid 1970s, Iran had gained control. The reasons for this were twofold.

While the stated goal of the United States government was the containment of communism, oil was also of growing importance to the general coherence of world capitalism and the unity of the world market. Importantly, in the case of Iran, oil also became linked to the international arms trade.

As oil revenues grew almost exponentially, profits were used to obtain the world’s most technologically advanced weaponry which Iran was now encouraged to purchase in order to implement the Nixon Doctrine.

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GLOBAL THREATS: CRIME, POVERTY, TERRORISM

May 17, 2013

Global Threats Today’s global threats are, in part, rooted in the urban growth that swept both the Soviet and Western camps during the half century Cold War.  Moreover, today’s challenges — crime, poverty, and terrorism — are quite different from those faced in last century’s ideological conflict with the Soviet Union. As we have seen [...]

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HERE COMES BATISTA — AGAIN!

May 14, 2013

  As we observed in one of our previous posts,  Havana: Post WW II and Limited Industrialization, Havana was not Cuba.  The capital was quite modern and habaneros enjoyed relatively high standards of living. Still, most Cubans did not live in Havana and, by 1952, Cubans were looking for new leadership. The idea of a military coup originated [...]

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COLD WAR IRAN: OIL AND WEAPONS (PART I)

May 13, 2013

Cold War Iran becomes a rentier state. Iran’s oil income began rising in the 1950s when the resolution of the oil crisis made increased state revenues possible. (For background on the oil crisis see Cold War Iran in the Aftermath of the 1953 Coup.) The first large jump in sales (236%) occurred between 1954 and 1955 [...]

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HAVANA AFTER WWII: LIMITED INDUSTRIALIZATION

May 7, 2013

The outbreak of the Korean War gave renewed life to Cuban sugar production. At the same time, Havana’s other economic sectors were stunted by widespread government corruption which served to inhibit economic transformation and entrench the sugar status quo. In this environment, trade unions pursued a policy of militant reformism as a way of safeguarding [...]

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TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN COLD WAR TAIWAN

May 6, 2013

Transnational corporations during the Cold War period concentrated on three categories of manufactured products from Taiwan and other less developed countries. The first category (much smaller than the other two) was made up of capital or technology intensive goods including chemicals, iron and steel, light engineering goods, machinery, and transport equipment. In this area, the initial [...]

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HAVANA: THE IMPORTANCE OF SUGAR

May 3, 2013

The importance of sugar to the Cuban economy — and to the capital city of Havana – has been summed up in the widely quoted phrase sin azucar, no hay pais (without sugar, there is no nation). It is notable, then, that as World War II ended, circumstances surrounding the world market for sugar brought a period of prosperity [...]

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